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I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly fifty years, a war has been raging in courts throughout
this country. The opponents are as follows: the tobacco industry and
plaintiffs alleging smoking-related injuries. Until recently, the tobacco industry had won every battle in this ongoing war. In fact, no
smoker recovered damages via verdict or settlement against a tobacco company until the 1990s.1 However, the tide of this great legal
battle has shifted.
Recently, in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Florida, a trial concluded that is easily the most stunning victory for plaintiffs alleging
smoking-related injuries in the long line of battles against the to* J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2001; B.A. Baylor University, 1996.
This Note is dedicated to my parents, Mr. & Mrs. Hugh D. Barr, Jr., for their continuous
love and support throughout my life. I thank Michael Wenger, the Florida State University
Law Review editorial staff, and Mr. Martin Levin for their assistance in the publication of
this Note. A special thanks goes to my fiance, Pam. For her contributions and support to
my life, she has my undying love and never-ending thanks.
1. See Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV . 354, 360 (2000). The actual numbe rs are even more staggering.
During the period of 1954 through 1994, 821 suits were filed against the tobacco industry;
not a single one of those cases resulted in monetary recovery for a plaintiff. See Michael
Orey, Litigation at a Crossroads: Litigation to Watch in 1995, AM . LAW ., May 1995, at 38,
38.
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bacco industry. The case was Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,2 a
class action suit that resulted in a punitive damages award of an unprecedented $144.8 billion.3 Seeking to punish the tobacco industry
for the wrongs it committed against all injured smokers in Florida,
this enormous award will, if affirmed upon appeal, eventually be
paid to all qualified members of the Engle class, a class estimated to
be comprised of 500,000 Florida residents. 4
While the amount of the award alone makes Engle a remarkable
event, easily the largest award in United States history, the Engle
case represents much more than just a vast amount of money.5 In
fact, Engle was an historic action long before the job of assessing punitive damages was even handed to the jury. Engle made history by
becoming the first certified class action for injured smokers to ever
reach a trial. 6 The case also made history when the jury broke from
the status quo by finding the tobacco industry liable for injuries
caused to Florida smokers 7 and awarding compensatory damages to
three representative class members. 8 These results alone established
Engle as quite possibly the greatest threat ever to the tobacco industry. However, despite the historic events surrounding this case, the
2. No. 94-08273 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 2000) (Trial record on file with author).
3. See Final Judgment and Amended Omnibus Order, Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco
Co., No. 94-08273 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000), http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/
tobacco/englerjfinaljudorder.pdf; see also Myron Levin, Jury Awards $145 Billion in
Landmark Tobacco Case, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at A1.
4. See Richard Willing, Smokers’ Suit Could Have Far-Reaching Implications, USA
TODAY, July 6, 1999, at A3.
5. See George Bennett, Tobacco Industry Told to Pay $145 Billion, PALM BCH. POST,
July 15, 2000, at A1. The Engle award is actually seven times larger than the previous record holder of $22 billion against the estate of Ferdinand Marcos. See id. The award
against Marcos was subsequently overturned on appeal. See Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d
1209 (Haw. 1998).
6. See Milo Geyelin, In Florida a Vast Tobacco Case Looms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1,
1998, at B1. The first class action to be certified was a nationwide class based on injuries
caused by smoker’s addiction to nicotine. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D.
544 (E.D. La. 1995). However, this class was quickly decertified by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeal. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). Following the
decertification of Castano, innovative plaintiffs’ lawyers filed actions in individual state
courts, thereby limiting the class to a statewide class. See infra text accompanying notes
127 and 128. Engle is the first class action to reach a trial based on damages caused to
smokers by addiction to nicotine. A previous class action, Broin v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 641
So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), was the first class action against the tobacco industry to
reach trial. See Ingrid L. Dietsch Field, No Ifs, Ands or Butts: Big Tobacco is Fighting for
Its Life Against a New Breed of Plaintiffs Armed with Mounting Evidence, 27 U. BALT. L.
REV . 99, 116 (1997). However, Broin dealt with injuries caused by secondhand smoke to
flight attendants, not injuries caused directly to smokers. See id.
7. See Verdict Form for Phase I, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. June 17, 1999) (on file with author).
8. See Verdict Form for Phase II, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 2000) (on file with author). The jury awarded a total of $12.7 million in compensatory damages to three representative class members in the second phase
of the Engle trial. See id.
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nation did not take notice of Engle until the jury sent a shockwave
through the United States by awarding $144.8 billion in punitive
damages to the entire Engle class. 9
Although many aspects of the Engle case were controversial, such
as the certification of the class, the plan set in place by the trial court
concerning the assessment of punitive damages caused some of the
most concern. While damages must usually be assessed individually,10 the Engle trial plan instructed the jury to assess punitive
damages in one lump sum to the entire Engle class prior to the assessment of compensatory damages for individual class members. 11
The controversy was that the tobacco companies would be ordered to
pay punitive damages to a class of an estimated 500,000 members
prior to determining the actual damages caused to individual class
members. This would set up a situation in which each class member
who later proves individual liability in the third and final phase of
the Engle trial plan would become entitled to an equal portion of the
punitive damages award irrespective of the amount of harm caused.
Based on the argument that the Engle trial plan violated Florida
law and the tobacco industry’s due process rights, the tobacco industry appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida in an attempt to stop the trial court’s plan for the assessment of punitive
damages. Initially, the Third District Court ruled in favor of the tobacco industry and quashed the trial court’s order permitting the assessment of lump sum punitive damages prior to a determination of
compensatory damages and stated that “the issue of damages, both
compensatory and punitive, must be tried on an individual basis.”12
However, just two weeks later, the Third District Court vacated this
ruling and set a date for oral argument on the issue. 13 Following oral
argument, the Third District Court reversed course and allowed the
trial court to assess punitive damages prior to the assessment of
compensatory damages. 14 The Florida Supreme Court subsequently
denied the tobacco industry’s petition for relief. 15 However, the peti9. See Final Judgment and Amended Omnibus Order, Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco
Co., No. 94-08273 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000), http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/
tobacco/englerjfinaljudorder.pdf; see also Levin, supra note 3.
10. See generally Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89 HARV . L. REV . 1318,
1517-23 (1976) (discussing the various methods courts employ for calculating and distributing damages in class action lawsuits).
11. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2061 (Fla. 3d DCA
Sept. 3, 1999) (quashing the trial court’s order permitting the jury to assess lump sum punitive damages), vacated, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2192 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 17, 1999).
12. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2061 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept.
3, 1999).
13. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2192 (Fla. 3d DCA
Sept. 17, 1999).
14. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2392 (Fla. 3d DCA
Oct. 20, 1999).
15. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 751 So. 2d 51, 51 (Fla. 1999).
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tion was denied without prejudice so that the tobacco companies
could raise this issue in any direct appeal.16
This Note will discuss the legality of this trial plan under both
Florida law and federal constitutional law and the likely outcome of
any postverdict appeals. The Note will begin, in Part II, by giving a
history of tobacco litigation in the United States and placing the
Engle case in perspective with the litigation that preceded it. In Part
III, the background of Engle will be discussed, from the implementation of the current trial plan to the record award of punitive damages. Part IV will discuss federal constitutional law on punitive
damages, focusing particularly on the due process requirements surrounding the assessment of punitive damages. Part IV will also review Florida law on the assessment of punitive damages as it stood
when the trial of Engle began. Finally, in Part V, the principles of
both federal constitutional and Florida law will be applied to Engle,
and the Note will discuss the likely outcome of any subsequent appeal.
II. THE HISTORY OF TOBACCO L ITIGATION
To fully understand the importance of Engle, the case must be put
in perspective by reviewing the history of tobacco litigation. For
nearly fifty years, litigation attempting to hold the tobacco industry
accountable for its actions has been pursued in the courts of this
country. This history has traditionally been discussed as occurring in
three separate waves. 17 Each wave in this history represents the application of different legal theories and strategies by both the tobacco
plaintiffs and the tobacco industry. 18 The first two waves were a complete wipeout by the tobacco industry. However, with the advent of
the third wave, the tobacco plaintiffs finally hit upon a successful
combination of strategy and theory.
A. The First Wave of Tobacco Litigation
In 1953, the public began to receive news of studies from the scientific community establishing a relationship between smoking and
cancer.19 This news was the catalyst of the first wave of tobacco liti-

16. See id.
17. See Maria Gabriela Bianchini, The Tobacco Agreement That Went Up in Smoke:
Defining the Limits of Congressional Intervention into Ongoing Mass Tort Litigation, 87
CAL. L. REV . 703, 710 (1999). See, e.g., Susan E. Kearns, Note, Decertification of Statewide
Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV . 1336, 1338 (1999).
18. See Bianchini, supra note 17, at 710; Kearns, supra note 17, at 1338.
19. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN.
L. REV . 853, 856 (1992). These findings reached the public when they were published in
the Journal of the American Medical Association and The Reader’s Digest. See id.
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gation.20 During this wave nearly 150 suits were filed; however, the
great majority of them were dropped without formal disposition. 21
Only ten cases reached trials, and the jury ruled for the tobacco industry in all of them. 22 Obviously, the disposal of nearly 150 cases
without being forced to pay out a cent in damages is an extraordinary
achievement. This achievement was a direct result of the legal theories adopted by the plaintiffs and the defense strategies adopted by
the tobacco industry.
The tobacco industry made the express decision to vigorously defend every suit and refuse to even consider offers of settlement. 23 In
implementing this vigorous defense policy, the tobacco industry generally established two very effective lines of defense. The first line of
defense was to “spare no cost in exhausting their adversaries’ resources” and to financially overcome each of the plaintiffs prior to the
trial phase in each case. 24 This line of defense was successful because
first-wave plaintiffs were generally litigating alone and the heavy
costs of maintaining suit eventually overburdened the plaintiffs’ lawyers. 25 As the tobacco companies predicted, most plaintiffs’ lawyers
were forced to drop their cases simply as a result of a negative cash
flow.26 This strategy was also effective because the tobacco companies
made litigation so expensive that no lawyer representing a single
plaintiff on a contingency fee basis could afford to maintain the case.
Quite simply, the lawyer’s costs would far exceed any potential gain
from a favorable verdict. 27 Thus, it was a very difficult burden to
overcome the pretrial financial hurdles put in place by the tobacco
industry. However, the prospects of recovery were not any better for
the few cases that survived to trial.

20. See id. at 857. Plaintiffs’ suits during the first wave of tobacco litigation were
based on both negligence and warranty theories. See id. at 859-60.
21. See id.
22. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 101.
23. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 857-58.
24. Id. at 857.
25. See id. at 858. Professor Rabin’s description of the lone personal injury lawyer
during the first wave is as follows:
Personal injury lawyers were, for the most part, lone wolves. They practiced
alone or in very small firms, relying on the quick disposition of a high turn-over
caseload to survive—in some instances, to flourish—in a contingency fee system. Heavy front-end costs, which cannot realistically be recouped in a losing
case from an impecunious client, are a major disincentive to involvement in
high-risk cases. So, too, are lengthy pretrial delays without prospect of settlement; cash-flow concerns are endemic to contingency fee representation.
Id.
26. See id. at 859.
27. See Tucker S. Player, Note, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global Settlement, and the Future of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L. REV . 311, 313 (1998).
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The reward of surviving the financial maze put in place by the tobacco industry was a verdict for the defense.28 During the first wave
of suits, which were filed based on negligence and warranty theories,
the tobacco industry successfully argued to the jury that the risk of
harm caused to the plaintiffs by smoking was not foreseeable. 29 In
stark contrast to the later waves of tobacco litigation, juries consistently found that even though the injuries at issue were due to cancer caused by smoking cigarettes, the risk of injury could not have
been foreseen by the tobacco industry.30 Because the tobacco companies could not foresee that their products created a risk of harm, the
companies could not be held liable for any injury caused by their
products. 31 Because the plaintiffs’ suits were based on theories of negligence and breach of warranty, and courts were hesitant to allow
claims of strict liability, a finding of unforeseeability prevented recovery.32
The end of the first wave was signaled in 1965 with the adoption
and publication of the Second Restatement of the Law of Torts.33 The
Restatement discussed the requirements necessary to find a manufacturer liable for a defective product. The writers of the Restatement
felt that for liability to attach, products must be both in a defective
condition and unreasonably dangerous. 34 Under the Restatement
view, while cigarettes were felt to be unreasonably dangerous, they
were not considered to be defective.35 This view was best summed up
by a Restatement comment where the writers stated that “[g]ood tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of
smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like
marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous.”36 This comment effectively ended the first wave of tobacco litigation as it gave the tobacco
companies nearly per se immunity against suit. 37
28. The tobacco companies maintained their strategy of placing an extreme financial
burden on the plaintiff once the case reached trial. As a result, of the 10 cases that reached
trial, four were dropped at some point during the trial. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 860.
29. See id. at 860-61. In the later waves, the primary dispute revolved around causation. See id. However, in the first wave, “juries seemed to accept the evidence of a generic
link between smoking and cancer.” Id. at 860.
30. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 105-06.
31. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 861.
32. See id. at 859. Although foreseeability is not required to find a manufacturer liable in a breach of implied warranty action, courts during this period did not hold a favorable view of true strict liability. See id. at 861. In fact, as announced in possibly the leading
case of the first wave, the manufacturer “is an insurer against foreseeable risks—but not
against unknowable risks.” Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 37 (5th Cir.
1963).
33. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 864; Player, supra note 27, at 314.
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965); see also Rabin, supra
note 19, at 863.
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
36. Id.
37. See Player, supra note 27, at 314.
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As the first wave of tobacco litigation came to a close, running
from roughly 1954-65, the tobacco industry had defeated the plaintiffs in every suit filed and had sent a strong message to any potential plaintiffs contemplating suit. Evidently, the plaintiffs received
the tobacco industry’s message as it took nearly twenty years for the
second wave of tobacco litigation to begin.
B. The Second Wave of Tobacco Litigation
When the second wave of tobacco litigation began in the early
1980s, great strides had been made in attempts to prove the link between smoking and cancer. The first such stride was the U.S. Surgeon General’s Report of 1964.38 Due to this report, “[t]he connection
between smoking and cancer was now firmly implanted in the minds
of Americans.”39 In response, Congress passed two new acts on smoking: the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (1965
Cigarette Act); 40 and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969 (1969 Cigarette Act).41 These three events firmly engrained in
the heads of the American public that cigarette smoking was dangerous and unhealthy.42
Like the American public, the plaintiffs’ attorneys who handled
the second wave of tobacco litigation also learned a great deal between the end of the first wave and the beginning of the second. One
major development leading to the beginning of the second wave of tobacco litigation was the rise of mass tort litigation—particularly asbestos litigation.43 The rise of asbestos litigation gave the future tobacco attorneys extensive experience in effectively establishing the
causal link between smoking and cancer.44 Ironically, the experience
was gathered arguing that the cause of cancer in the asbestos cases
38. See id. (citing PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE , U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &
WELFARE , PUB. NO. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO
THE SURGEON G ENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 26 (1964)). While this report was
originally viewed as good evidence of a causal link between smoking and cancer and beneficial to plaintiffs, the report ended up being a good line of defense for the tobacco industry.
The results of the report became common knowledge and were good support for the argument that the plaintiffs knew the dangers of smoking and had assumed the risk.
39. Player, supra note 27, at 315.
40. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 283 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333
(1994)). This legislation made it unlawful to “manufacture, package, or import for sale or
distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of which fails to bear”
warnings on the effects of tobacco use. Id.
41. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 88 (1969) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994)). This
legislation included the following preemption clause: “No requirement or prohibition based
on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.” Id.
42. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 864.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 865.
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was solely asbestos exposure and not the exposure to smoking.45 The
plaintiffs’ attorneys then solved the major problem of the first
wave—the cost of litigating against the tobacco industry—by pooling
resources with other attorneys instead of acting alone.46 Further, the
plaintiffs no longer had to worry about the problem of foreseeability
because strict liability, which focused on the intrinsically dangerous
nature of a product, was now fully accepted in products liability
law.47 However, even with all of these new found advantages, by the
close of the second wave and the filing of 175-200 cases, 48 the tobacco
industry would still be able to proclaim that “after thirty-five years of
litigation, . . . it had not paid out a cent in tort awards.”49
In continuing its impressive winning streak, the tobacco industry
relied on one of its favorite defenses from the first wave and developed several new theories of defense to combat the unique legal theories being applied by the plaintiffs. The tobacco industry’s first line of
defense was, as in the first wave, to wear down the plaintiffs by simply making the litigation more expensive than the prospect of any recovery.50 While the pooling of resources allowed many more plaintiffs
in the second wave to reach the trial stage than in the first wave, the
strategy of financially wearing down the plaintiffs was still an effective way to eliminate many cases. 51 However, the most effective pretrial strategy was no longer to try to overextend the finances of the
plaintiff but to argue that federal law preempted the plaintiffs’
claims. 52 Still, while these were two large hurdles for the plaintiffs to
overcome, the prospects of reaching trial were much better than in
the first wave. Yet, once a case reached trial, the plaintiffs had to
45. See id.
46. See id. at 866.
47. See id. The most common form of strict liability in tort was the form adopted by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A. Under section 402A:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it was sold.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). The doctrine of strict liability in
tort as stated in section 402A was adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in 1976. See West
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976). The plaintiffs also had the advantage of the comparative fault principle in that some of the risks of smoking could be assumed by the plaintiff without losing the right to recover. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 866.
48. See Rabin supra note 19, at 867 n.88.
49. Id. at 874.
50. See id. at 867-68.
51. See id. at 868.
52. See Player, supra note 27, at 318. The argument was simply that the 1965 and
1969 Cigarette Acts preempted all state common law damages claims. Allowing these
claims would effectively force the tobacco companies to apply different warnings on their
cigarette packaging and advertising and thus circumvent the purpose of Congress. See id.
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overcome the two great trial arguments of the tobacco industry: causation and assumption of risk. 53
These two arguments were simply too much for the plaintiffs to
overcome. In arguing causation, the tobacco industry began by “attacking the plaintiff and his lifestyle” to show that perhaps tobacco
use was not the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. 54 The tobacco companies would then present their own independent research to challenge
the reports linking tobacco use to cancer. 55 Based on this evidence,
many juries had difficulty believing that tobacco use was the legal
cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries. 56 Still, even if the plaintiffs were able
to convince the jury that smoking was the legal cause of injury, the
plaintiffs had to convince juries that they had not assumed the risk
of smoking.
The most effective trial argument of the tobacco industry in the
second wave was assumption of risk. 57 Because the general public
considered it common knowledge that smoking caused cancer, the tobacco lawyers simply argued that plaintiffs knew smoking was potentially dangerous and chose to do it anyway.58 The plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried to deflect this argument by arguing that, while they
had assumed some risk, addiction to the nicotine in tobacco products
prevented smokers from making an informed decision on whether to
smoke. 59 At the very least, plaintiffs argued that the tobacco industry
must be held partly liable. 60 However, juries were not impressed with
these arguments and generally found that the plaintiffs were totally
to blame for their injuries. 61
Still, despite all of the disappointments of the second wave, the
plaintiffs did not suffer a total loss. In 1988, the first jury verdict ordering a tobacco company to pay damages to an injured smoker was
entered in Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.62 The jury in Cippollone
found the tobacco companies were 20% liable for the injuries to the
plaintiff, Rose Cippollone, but, because New Jersey law required a
finding of 50% liability to allow recovery, no damages were awarded

53. See id. at 316-17.
54. Id. at 316.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 317.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 317-18.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 317. A good example of this type of reaction is the case of Horton v.
American Tobacco Co., No. 12325 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 1990). In Horton, the jury found
that the American Tobacco Company was at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, but denied the
plaintiff any award of damages. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 871.
62. 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988). The estate of Rose Cippollone brought suit for
injuries allegedly sustained from smoking cigarettes manufactured by Liggett Group. See
id.
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for Mrs. Cippollone’s injuries. 63 However, the jury awarded $400,000
in damages to Mrs. Cippollone’s husband for his claim of wrongful
death.64 It appeared that the plaintiffs had ended the tobacco industry’s impressive winning streak; however, the brief success enjoyed
by this verdict was not to last.
Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit overturned the jury award and held that all common law
damages claims were preempted by the 1965 and 1969 Cigarette
Acts. 65 The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve the
issue of preemption as it concerned the 1965 and 1969 Cigarette
Acts. 66 In its ruling, the Court held that all common law damages
claims were not preempted by the Cigarette Acts and found the following: 1) the 1965 Cigarette Act did not preempt state common law
damages claims; 67 2) the 1969 Cigarette Act did preempt state common law damage claims for failure to warn;68 and 3) the 1969 Cigarette Act did not preempt claims of express warranty, intentional
fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.69 Cippollone was then
remanded for a new trial. 70 While this appeared to be good news for
the Cippollone family, the enormous expense of pursuing the case up
to the Supreme Court, about $6.2 million,71 forced the Cippollones’
lawyers to drop the suit. 72
Cippollone marked the end of the second wave of tobacco litigation.73 While the plaintiffs had obtained their first favorable jury verdict, in terms of actual recovery, the plaintiffs had failed to recover
any compensation from the tobacco industry. Further, this lone favorable verdict was not for injuries caused to a smoker, as the jury
felt the smoker was to blame for her injuries, but was for a wrongful
death claim by the smoker’s spouse. Thus, it appeared the only way
for the plaintiffs to overcome the defense of assumption of risk and
convince the jury that they were not to blame would be to prove a
mass cover-up and conspiracy. However, after forty years of litigation, plaintiffs had thus far failed to recover the proverbial smoking
gun from internal tobacco industry documents. 74 If such an internal
document could be found, perhaps juries would no longer believe that
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 581-82 (3d Cir. 1990).
66. See Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 499 U.S. 935 (1991).
67. See Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1992).
68. See id. at 524.
69. See id. at 531.
70. See id.
71. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 114.
72. See Richard A. Daynard & Graham E. Kelder, Jr., The Many Virtues of Tobacco
Litigation, TRIAL, Nov. 1, 1998, at 34, 36.
73. See Player, supra note 27, at 319.
74. See Rabin, supra note 19, at 875.
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the plaintiffs had assumed the risk of smoking. However, the prospect of finding such a document seemed so bleak that one leading
commentator lamented at the close of the second wave that “[w]hile
it is possible that a new wave of lawsuits would unearth egregious
evidence of a cover-up, it seems unlikely.”75
C. The Third Wave of Tobacco Litigation
The predictions of the plaintiffs’ inability to prove a mass cover-up
turned out to be incorrect. Not only would plaintiffs be able to prove
a mass cover-up, the third wave of tobacco litigation would bring the
first real successes against the tobacco industry. Ironically, the only
permanent successes have been enormous settlements—an abrupt
shift in strategy from the first two waves of litigation when the tobacco companies refused to even consider settlement.
There are many causes to this recent turnaround. First, the plaintiffs are now applying strategies intended to prevent the tobacco industry from taking advantage of its superior financial position. This
has been done largely through the filing of large class actions, casemanagement orders designed to prevent the tobacco industry from
causing inordinate delay, and lawsuits by state governments for reimbursement of state funds spent on healthcare for smoking-related
injuries. 76 In addition, plaintiffs are now able to take advantage of a
wealth of internal tobacco documents that prove the one thing that
can overcome the past problems of causation and assumption of
risk—a long-running conspiracy by the tobacco industry.
The first documents became available to the plaintiffs on May 12,
1994, when a box of documents belonging to the Brown and Williamson Tobacco Company, known collectively as the Cigarette Papers,
was anonymously sent to Professor Stanton Glantz at the University
of California.77 Detailing years of deception and a mass conspiracy to
cover-up the truths of tobacco use by the entire tobacco industry, the
Cigarette Papers proved the “egregious cover-up” that commentators
felt was “unlikely” just two years earlier. 78 While these documents
alone may have been enough to show the deceptive practices of the
tobacco industry, the tobacco plaintiffs received further proof after
twenty-two state Attorneys General settled their suits for reimbursement of Medicaid expenses with the Liggett & Myers Corpora75. Id. at 875.
76. See Daynard & Kelder, supra note 72, at 36.
77. See Player, supra note 27, at 322.
78. Id. The documents were sent to Professor Glantz by a paralegal working for the
firm representing Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation. See id. Among other damaging revelations, the documents “detailed over thirty years of fraud and deceit by not only
[Brown and Williamson] but also the entire tobacco industry. The documents revealed that
the industry [had] known conclusively since the sixties that tobacco use [was] directly correlated with cancer and that . . . nicotine was an addictive drug.” Id.
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tion (hereinafter Liggett & Myers).79 As part of the settlement with
Liggett & Myers, Bennett LeBow, the corporation’s CEO, agreed to
publicly affirm that smoking does in fact cause numerous illnesses
and that the tobacco companies do indeed target children.80 However,
the biggest contribution of Liggett & Myers was 250,000 pages in
documents that further implicated the tobacco industry in a mass
conspiracy.81
With these documents in hand and the protection of court orders
forcing the tobacco industry to litigate without excessive delay, individual plaintiffs finally began to defeat the great trial arguments of
the tobacco industry and obtain favorable jury verdicts. The first
such verdict was entered by a Florida jury in Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Carter.82 The Carter jury was the first to decide a
case during the third wave, and by no coincidence, was also the first
jury to hear the information provided in the Cigarette Papers. 83 However, the great hopes of success in the third wave for individual
plaintiffs were dimmed when the jury’s verdict assessing $750,000 in
damages was overturned on appeal.84
Shortly after Carter, another verdict assessing damages against
the tobacco company occurred in the case of Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Widdick.85 This time another Florida jury found in
favor of the plaintiff and assessed damages of $950,000 against
Brown & Williamson.86 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, Widdick, like
Carter, remained true to the history of tobacco litigation and was also
overturned on appeal. 87 However, unlike the second wave of tobacco
litigation, the prospect of having a favorable verdict overturned on
appeal has not prevented others from trying to hold the tobacco industry liable.
79. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 122.
80. See id. at 122-23.
81. See id. at 123. In exchange for these concessions and an agreement to pay 25% of
its pretax profits for the next 25 years to the states, the suits against Liggett were dropped
and plaintiffs in those 22 states were barred from suing Liggett. See id. at 123.
82. 723 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (discussing the jury verdict handed down in
Duval County Circuit Court).
83. See Daynard & Kelder, supra note 72, at 36.
84. See Carter, 723 So. 2d at 836. The Florida First District Court of Appeal held that
the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff’s claim. See id. at 836. Fortunately for
the plaintiff, the Florida Supreme Court subsequently quashed the opinion of the First
District Court and held that the statute of limitations had not run on the plaintiff’s claim.
See Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 25 Fla. L. Weekly S1072 (Fla. Nov. 22,
2000).
85. 717 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (discussing the jury verdict handed down in
Duval County Circuit Court).
86. See Noreen Marcus, Big Tobacco’s Victory Record Remains Intact, FT. LAUD. SUN
SENT., June 23, 1998, at B6.
87. See Widdick, 717 So. 2d at 573. This time the verdict was overturned because the
trial court abused its discretion in not granting Brown & Williamson’s motion for change of
venue. See id. at 573-74.
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Since Widdick, several juries outside of Florida have held in favor
of the plaintiffs and have ordered tobacco companies to pay damages.
In particular, a California jury assessed damages against the tobacco
industry in the amount of $51.5 million and an Oregon jury assessed
damages in the amount of $80.3 million. 88 While these judgments
were subsequently reduced and are currently in the process of appeal, they show that juries are no longer convinced by the arguments
of the tobacco industry.89 Still, the likelihood of a recovery large
enough to offset the great expense of bringing tobacco suits to trial
makes the prospect of successfully bringing suit as an individual
plaintiff a very risky proposition. However, suits by lone, individual
plaintiffs are no longer the real threat to the tobacco industry. 90 The
real threat comes in the form of two actions unique to the third wave
of tobacco litigation: 1) suits filed by individual states to recover state
Medicaid funds spent on tobacco-related injuries and 2) class actions
filed on the behalf of mass plaintiffs against the entire tobacco industry. These two types of actions are producing results against the tobacco industry that could not have been imagined just a few years
ago.
1. State Actions for Reimbursement of Medicaid Funds
The civil actions filed by individual states seeking Medicaid reimbursement were the first of the two real threats to produce actual results against the tobacco industry. Medicaid was established by Title
XIX of the Social Security Act to serve as a medical assistance program. 91 Designed to provide medical services for eligible individuals
through the cooperation of state and federal government, the Medicaid program requires the state to “take all reasonable measures to
ascertain the legal liability of all third parties . . . to pay for care and
service available under the plan.”92 Thus, a state, as an administrator of the Medicaid program, can state a claim for restitution against
the tobacco industry when the state was forced to pay the cost of
treating its citizens for injuries caused by products of the tobacco industry.93
Mississippi was the first state to take advantage of this language
and filed suit against the tobacco industry on May 23, 1994.94 By
1997, forty of the fifty states, including Florida, on February 21,
88. See Levin, supra note 3.
89. See id.
90. See Bianchini, supra note 17, at 712.
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (2000).
92. Id.
93. See Cliff Sherrill, Comment, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party Liability
and Claims for Restitution, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 497, 501 (1997).
94. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 116.
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1995,95 had followed Mississippi’s lead and filed suit seeking to obtain Medicaid reimbursements. 96 The theory of recovery underlying
each individual suit was essentially the same: the tobacco industry
had allegedly conspired to conceal the addictive nature of nicotine
and that smoking caused many different types of disease and illness. 97 There were two primary arguments used by the states: 1) the
state cannot have assumed the risk of smoking as the state was simply a bystander paying to treat the tobacco-related illnesses of its
citizens; and 2) the states could prove, largely through the Cigarette
Papers and the Liggett & Myers documents, that the tobacco industry knew about the health problems associated with smoking, concealed that information and, in fact, manipulated the nicotine levels
of its products in order to maintain a steady customer base. 98
By 1996, as a result of the suits filed by the individual states, the
tobacco industry was forced to defend suits, not against individual
plaintiffs with limited financial means, but against well-financed
states with highly damaging evidence in the form of internal industry documents. 99 The tobacco industry was finally forced to face the
great possibility of losing cases and huge judgments being entered

95. See Christa Sarafara, Making Tobacco Companies Pay: The Florida Medicaid
Third-Party Liability Act, 2 DE PAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 123, 136 (1997). The State of Florida went further than just suing the tobacco industry; the Florida Legislature amended
state law to better the state’s chances of recovering against the tobacco industry. See id. at
133-34. The amended law specifically precluded any third party who may be liable for
Medicaid costs from using affirmative defenses like comparative negligence, assumption of
risk, and “all other affirmative defenses normally available to a liable third party.” FLA.
STAT. § 409.910(1) (1997) (currently codified at FLA. STAT. § 409.910(1) (2000)). The new
statute also allowed the state to make a claim for Medicaid reimbursement without having
to assume the position of the Medicaid recipient or identify each recipient individually. See
id. As if this were not enough, the amended law eliminated the burden of proving which
manufacturer caused which specific injury, eliminated the statute of repose, and allowed
for proof of causation through statistical analysis. See id. The effect of the statute was to
allow the state to mount an all-out offensive strictly against the tobacco industry. The Florida Supreme Court explained that Governor Lawton Chiles even “ordered the relevant executive branch officials to pursue the recovery of Medicaid expenditures from only the tobacco industry.” Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., 678 So. 2d
1239, 1246 (Fla. 1996) (citing Fla. Exec. Order No. 95-105 (Mar. 28, 1995).
96. See Bianchini, supra note 17, at 712. Suits to recover costs spent by government to
treat tobacco-related illnesses are not limited to just the individual states. Several foreign
countries, like Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Thailand, Venezuela, and Brazil
have filed suit in American courts. See Dagan & White, supra note 1, at 363 (citing Alison
Frankel, One Planet, A Multitude of Tobacco Plaintiffs, AM . LAW ., Apr. 1999, at 24; Rio
Sues U.S. Tobacco Firms for Cost of Treating Smokers, WALL ST. J. INTERACTIVE ED., July
14 1999, http://interactive.wsj.com). In addition, several other foreign countries have filed
suit in courts within their respective countries. See Dagan & White, supra note 1, at 363
(citing Saundra Torry, Cigarette Firms Sued by Foreign Governments: Tobacco Industry
Faces Foreign Lawsuits in U.S., WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1999, at A12).
97. See Sherrill, supra note 93, at 506.
98. See id. at 512.
99. See Bianchini, supra note 17, at 712.
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against it. 100 With all of this mounting pressure, for the first time in
the history of tobacco litigation, the tobacco industry blinked.
The first break came on March 20, 1997, when Liggett & Myers
broke rank with the rest of the tobacco industry and offered to settle
with the states. 101 Because Liggett & Myers was one of the smallest
tobacco companies and facing financial difficulty, it decided it could
not afford to maintain the status quo by refusing to talk settlement
and risking a massive judgment.102 Thus, for a comparatively slight
financial pay out, some very damaging admissions, and the release of
internal documents, Liggett & Myers “struck a deal with the states’
Attorneys General and ended the conspiracy of silence and fraud
which had endured for over fifty years.”103
Shortly following the settlement with Liggett & Myers, the tobacco industry as a whole broke against its past traditions and entered into negotiations with the all of the states’ Attorneys General. 104 The tobacco industry decided to break from its prior history
and enter these negotiations in an attempt to level the playing field
by getting the states out of tobacco litigation and getting back to the
days of litigating against individual plaintiffs with limited financing.105
Thus, on June 20, 1997, a deal was struck between the tobacco industry and the Attorneys General of forty states. 106 In exchange for
the payment of $368.5 billion to the individual states, the states
agreed to recommend a federal bill to Congress that limited tobacco
industry liability to individual and class plaintiffs. 107 Finalization of
the settlement then rested on action by Congress. 108 However, in
June 1998, because of the numerous changes made to the proposed
legislation by various legislators, by the time the bill reached the

100. See id.
101. See Player, supra note 27, at 329.
102. See id. at 330.
103. Id. (citing Joseph Menn & Carrick Mollenkamp, Global Tobacco Pact Could Break
Liggett, NEWS AND O BSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 27, 1997, at A5).
104. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 125.
105. See Bianchini, supra note 17, at 712-13.
106. See id. at 705.
107. See Dagan & White, supra note 1, at 364.
108. See Bianchini, supra note 17, at 705. The passage of the proposed settlement by
Congress would have vastly limited the liability of the tobacco industry. To start, the proposed settlement would settle “all lawsuits filed by state or local governments, most pending class action lawsuits, and all individual suits based on claims of addiction or dependency.” Id. at 708. Further, “[a]ll class action lawsuits, and other procedural aggregation devices were to be banned . . . .” Id. This, of course, would force all future suits against the
tobacco industry to be brought individually, tilting the playing field back in favor of the tobacco industry. To top the entire thing off, the settlement would ban all suits based on
claims of addiction and dependency, would eliminate punitive damages, and cap the total
amount that could be ordered paid to claimants in any single year. See id. at 709. “In short,
the agreement would have stopped existing lawsuits and deterred future suits.” Id.
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Senate floor, the tobacco industry had withdrawn its support for the
bill and successfully lobbied for its defeat. 109
While the proposed bill was winding its way through Congress,
the tobacco industry and the individual states did not have time to
wait and see if Congress would pass the proposed legislation as the
state suits continued toward trial. Wanting to settle these cases prior
to trial, the tobacco industry entered into negotiations with several
states whose trials were quickly approaching. In July 1997, Mississippi became the first state to settle with the tobacco industry for a
total of $3.4 billion. 110 Florida soon followed by settling for $11.3 billion.111 Florida was followed by Texas, who settled its suit for $14.5
billion. 112 Finally, Minnesota, which settled only after its trial had
entered closing arguments, settled with the tobacco industry for $6.5
billion and became the final state to settle individually with the tobacco industry.113 If the proposed global settlement were to be finalized by the appropriate congressional action, those individual settlements would serve as those four states’ individual payments. When
Congress failed to pass the required legislation, Mississippi, Florida,
Texas, and Minnesota became the only states with hard deals in
place.
The remaining forty-six states got their deal in November 1998. 114
Approved by the remaining forty-six states and the tobacco industry,
the settlement provided for a total of $206 billion to be paid out by
the tobacco industry in annual installments until 2025.115 Because
this deal did not require comprehensive legislation to pass Congress,
it became final once agreed upon by all parties. 116 Thus, all fifty
states were now settled with the tobacco industry. For under $300
billion, the tobacco industry was able to reimburse all fifty states for
Medicaid funds spent to treat injuries caused by tobacco products. To
date, these state settlements have produced the only actual monetary
recoveries from the tobacco industry untouchable on appeal.

109. See Dagan & White, supra note 1, at 370. For example, the total amount of settlement proceeds to be paid by the state was increased to $516 billion, and the protections
from civil liability included in the original settlement were not included in the version of
the bill that made it through committee. See id. at 369.
110. See id. at 370.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 370-71.
113. See id. at 371.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 372.
116. The settlement also does not include many of the protections the tobacco industry
had negotiated in the first global settlement proposal. See id. For instance, this settlement
does not include a prohibition of class actions or punitive damages. See id.
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2. Class Actions
The second real threat to the tobacco industry in the third wave of
tobacco litigation is the class action. The class action has enabled
plaintiffs to better meet the tobacco industry’s various litigation
strategies by allowing the plaintiffs to aggregate and share resources
and information.117 The first class action was filed in federal district
court in New Orleans, Louisiana, on March 29, 1994.118
The case of Castano v. American Tobacco Company119 was filed on
behalf of all people addicted to nicotine in the United States. 120 The
class potentially included over one hundred million people and was
easily the largest class action ever filed.121 The case, which depended
on theories of negligence, fraud, and deceit in its claim that the tobacco companies had concealed and suppressed material research
that showed nicotine is highly addictive, would be taken on and financed by sixty private law firms from across the country.122 The case
was then certified as a class action in a controversial opinion by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on
February 17, 1995.123
The plaintiffs’ goal of resolving all of the nation’s tobacco addiction
claims in one massive suit was quickly dissolved on interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 124
Finding that the district court erred by “ignoring variations in state
law and how a trial on the alleged causes of action would be tried,”
117. See Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV . 63, 64 (1997).
118. See id. at 72. Note that this was the first class action filed on behalf of smokers,
however, an earlier class action was brought against the tobacco industry in 1991 on behalf
of flight attendants who claimed harm from secondhand smoke. See infra Part.III.A and
accompanying text.
119. 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995).
120. See Dietsch Field, supra note 6, at 115.
121. See Symposium, Theorizing about Trial Courts: Lawyers, Policymaking, and Tobacco Litigation, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 910 (1998).
122. See id. The case was initially in the hands of Wendall Gauthier, a private lawyer
in New Orleans. See id. Mr. Gauthier then contacted the other 60 firms and convinced
them to join him in prosecuting the case. See id. Each firm agreed to donate $100,000 per
year, a total of $6 million per year, to finance the suit. See id.
123. See Castano, 160 F.R.D. at 560-61. The court defined the class as:
(a) All nicotine-dependent persons in the United States, its territories, and possessions and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, who have purchased and
smoked cigarettes manufactured by the defendants [tobacco companies];
(b) the estates, representatives, and administrators of these nicotine-dependent
cigarette smokers; and,
(c) the spouses, children, relatives and “significant others” of these nicotinedependent cigarette smokers as their heirs or survivors.
Id. There has already been much scholarly discussion of the Castano case. For a good overview of the court’s reasons for certifying the class action, see Robert T. Krebs, Note, Castano v. American Tobacco Co.: Class Treatment of Mass Torts is Going Up in Smoke, 24 N.
K Y. L. REV . 673 (1997).
124. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
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the Fifth Circuit explained that “the collective wisdom of individual
juries is necessary before [this court] commits the fate of an entire
industry or, indeed, the fate of a class of millions, to a single jury.”125
Further, because of the novelty of the plaintiffs’ addiction-based
claims, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it could not allow the district
court to correct any of the perceived errors on remand but must, instead, remand the case and instruct the district court to dismiss the
complaint entirely. 126
The attorneys involved in the Castano case, however, were not yet
ready to give up the fight. After Castano was decertified, the sixty
private law firms involved in the filing of Castano filed smaller class
action suits, called “Sons of Castano,” in state and federal courts
throughout the country.127 However, with Castano standing as precedent, state and federal courts followed the lead of the Fifth Circuit
and either refused to certify these class actions or decertified them on
appeal. 128
After the failure of Castano and the “Sons of Castano” to maintain
certification, the class action was viewed as a nonthreat to the tobacco industry.129 It seemed that the plaintiffs had lost a great advantage and would no longer be able to level the playing field with
the tobacco industry through mass class actions. Instead, it appeared
plaintiffs would again be forced to bring suit individually.130 Yet,
while all of the attention was being focused on Castano and its descendants, the real class action threat to the tobacco industry was
brewing in Florida. A Florida attorney, Stanley Rosenblatt, filed two
separate class actions against the tobacco industry in Miami, Florida:
Broin v. Phillip Morris Cos. 131 and Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.132 These two actions would go on to become not merely the first,
and thus far, the only class actions to reach trial against the tobacco
industry, but Engle would go on to become the only class action to result in a verdict for the plaintiffs.
III. BACKGROUND OF ENGLE V. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO .
A. Broin v. Phillip Morris Cos.
Originally filed in 1991, Broin v. Phillip Morris Cos. was a class
action suit seeking to recover for injuries caused to a class of 60,000
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 751-52.
See id. at 752.
Kearns, supra note 17, at 1354.
See id. at 1354-55.
See Dagan & White, supra note 1, at 362.
See Bianchini, supra note 17, at 717.
641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1994).
No. 94-08273 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1994).
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flight attendants from the inhalation of secondhand smoke.133 The
class members were nonsmokers throughout the United States who
alleged they were injured by secondhand smoke from the cigarettes
of airline passengers. 134 Because Broin was brought on behalf of a
class of nonsmokers, it was particularly dangerous to the tobacco industry because it effectively prevented tobacco lawyers from arguing
the defense of assumption of risk. 135
When the trial court refused to certify Broin as a proper class action, it appeared that this case would suffer the same fate as Castano
and its progeny; however, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order refusing certification and ordered that
the case be remanded for the certification of a class of all nonsmoking
flight attendants alleging injury.136 The stage was then set for the
first class action against the tobacco industry to proceed to trial before Judge Robert Kaye.
Surprisingly, four months into the trial, in May 1997, the tobacco
industry once again backed down from its proud traditions and settled with the Broin class for $349 million.137 Even though the individual class members did not receive any of the settlement proceeds,
the settlement reserved the right for each class member to bring suit
individually against the tobacco industry to recover for his or her injuries. 138
While the Broin class action was historic for being the first class
action to reach trial against the tobacco industry, plaintiffs had still
failed to bring a successful class action suit against the tobacco industry for the majority of those injured by the industry’s products—
the smokers. However, Mr. Rosenblatt was not finished and followed
the certification of Broin with the certification of a case of much
greater proportion.
B. Certification of the Engle class
Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. was filed on May 5, 1994, and
sought damages on behalf of all citizens of the United States injured

133. 641 So. 2d at 889.
134. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 117, at 72.
135. While technically it could be argued that the flight attendants assumed the risk,
as they knew passengers smoked and could have found another job but chose not to, this
argument probably would not hold much weight with a jury. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A
Morality Play’s Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud and Consumer Choice in “Third
Wave” Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. K AN. L. REV . 465, 475-76 (1998).
136. See Broin v. Phillip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888, 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
137. See Cupp, supra note 135, at 475.
138. See Dagan & White, supra note 1, at 362 n.34. The settlement established a foundation to study tobacco-related disease and its treatment. See id. While the individual class
members can still bring suit individually, any claims of punitive damages are prevented by
the settlement. See id.
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by their addiction to cigarettes. 139 The primary assertion in the Engle
complaint was that the tobacco industry intentionally manipulated
the nicotine levels in their cigarettes and concealed all information
about the addictive nature of the drug.140 To compensate the class for
injuries caused by the addictive nature of nicotine and the concealment of this information, the complaint sought $200 billion in damages. 141 Remarkably, Engle overcame the great hurdle of previous
class actions filed on behalf of injured smokers when Circuit Judge
Harold Solomon certified the nationwide class. 142
The decision to certify the class was immediately appealed by the
tobacco industry. Despite the tobacco industry’s arguments concerning the nonviability of class certification and the precedent set by
Castano and its progeny, with only one major modification, the Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed class certification. 143 The Third District Court modified the order certifying a nationwide class by reducing it to “manageable proportions” and restricting the class to Florida
citizens and residents. 144 The Third District Court advised, however,
that “certain individual issues [would] have to be tried as to each
class member, principally the issue of damages . . . .”145 Thus, the
Third District Court, in its original opinion, concluded that while
“the basic issues of liability common to all members of the class
[would] clearly predominate over the individual issues” and thus allow for class certification, the issue of damages could not be decided
as a class but must instead be tried individually after the determination of the basic issues of liability for the class. 146
C. Application of the Original Engle Trial Plan
Once the class was certified, a trial plan had to be devised that
would enable the trial of a class action comprising possibly 500,000
Floridians. The original trial judge, Judge Allen Postman, devised a

139. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 117, at 73.
140. See id.
141. See Kearns, supra note 17, at 1356.
142. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
143. See id.
144. Id. at 42. The court stated that it did not feel there was anything “inherently
wrong about certifying a national class in a state court,” as it had done in Broin. Id. However, it felt that where “the class contains so many members from so many different states
and territories that it threatens to overwhelm the resources of a state court, it is settled
that such a broad-based class is totally unmanageable and cannot be certified.” Id. The
class consists of “[a]ll Florida citizens and residents, and their survivors, who have suffered, presently suffer or who have died from diseases and medical conditions caused by
their addiction to cigarettes that contain nicotine.” Kelder & Daynard, supra note 117, at
73.
145. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d at 41.
146. Id.
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three-phase trial plan to accomplish this purpose. 147 In Phase I, the
plaintiffs would have to prove that the tobacco industry caused injuries to the class by manipulating the nicotine level in its cigarettes
and that the industry misled the public about the addictive nature of
nicotine. 148 The jury would also have to determine if the actions of the
tobacco industry permitted punitive damages and, if so, how they
would be calculated. 149 In Phase II, the representative class members
would have to prove actual damages, and the jury would assess the
amount of compensatory damages required to compensate these representative class members for their injuries. 150 Finally, Phase III of
the trial would consist of individual trials for the other class members to determine whether they were entitled to compensatory damages. 151 However, after establishing the trial plan, Judge Postman
was forced to withdraw from the case for health reasons and Judge
Robert Kaye, the same judge who heard Broin, took over.152 The case
was then ready to proceed to trial.
After three months of voir dire, a jury of six, with ten alternates,
was selected, and Phase I of the trial began on October 19, 1998.153
Nearly nine months later, the jury returned its verdict for Phase I on
July 7, 1999.154 The jury found the following: 1) smoking cigarettes
causes several types of disease and medical conditions; 2) cigarettes
containing nicotine are addictive; 3) the tobacco industry’s products
were defective and unreasonably dangerous; 4) the tobacco industry
made false statements of material fact with the intention of misleading smokers; 5) the tobacco industry concealed material information
concerning the health effects and addictive nature of smoking; 6) the
tobacco companies entered into an agreement to misrepresent and
conceal information on the health effects of smoking and its addictive
nature; 7) the products sold by the tobacco industry were not reasonably fit for the use intended and did not conform to representa147. See Milo Geyelin, Jury Selection Set to Begin Today in Class Action by Florida
Smokers, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1998, at A19.
148. See id.
149. See id. Judge Postman’s plan was to have the jury set a ratio of compensatory
damages to punitive damages in order to determine the amount of punitive damages to
which each class member would be entitled following individual trials on damages. See
Engle Defendant’s Pursue Efforts to Remove Judge at County, Appellate Levels, MEALEY’S
LITIG. R EP.: TOBACCO, Sept. 2, 1999, at 53 [hereinafter, Efforts to Remove Judge].
150. See Geyelin, supra note 147. The representative class members would then be entitled to the appropriate amount of punitive damages as determined by the ratio set by the
jury during Phase I.
151. See id. Again, punitive damages would be determined by the ratio set in Phase I.
Of course, if the jury found that the tobacco industry was not liable in Phase I, the trial
would never proceed to Phases II and III.
152. See id.
153. See Jenny Staletovich, $200 Million Suit Against Tobacco Opens Combatively,
PALM BCH. POST, Oct. 20, 1998, at A1.
154. See Kearns, supra note 17, at 1357.
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tions of fact made by the tobacco industry; 8) the tobacco industry
failed to exercise the degree of care which a reasonable cigarette
manufacturer would exercise; 9) the tobacco industry engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the intent to inflict severe emotional distress; and most importantly, 10) the egregious conduct of
the tobacco industry permitted punitive damages. 155 After the jury
found that the tobacco industry’s actions rose to a level that permits
punitive damages, the case was supposed to proceed to the determination of the ratio that would be used in figuring the amount of punitive damages in each class member’s individual trial. Instead, Judge
Kaye made the decision to amend the operating trial plan.156
D. The Amended Engle Trial Plan
Judge Kaye entered his supplemental trial plan and radically altered the procedure by which punitive damages would be assessed.
Instead of following the plan as set by Judge Postman and instructing the jury to set a ratio by which punitive damages would be entered, Judge Kaye’s plan would instruct the jury to award punitive
damages, if it found punitive damages were warranted, in one lump
sum. 157 The punitive damages issue would be tried as part of Phase II
but would be bifurcated from the assessment of compensatory damages to the representative class members. 158 Thus, according to Judge
Kaye’s trial plan, the issue of punitive damages would be completed
at the close of Phase II and individual trials on punitive damages
would be unnecessary.159
While Judge Kaye admitted that his amended trial plan was contrary to the plan devised by his predecessor, he felt that “there [were]
far less legal issues and problems” with a plan to assess punitive
damages in one lump sum than in a plan that determined punitive
damages under a ratio because of the unique circumstances in
Engle.160 Judge Kaye stated that the assessment of punitive damages
in one lump sum was superior to the previous plan because “a punitive defendant will know what its overall obligation is at the close of
155. See Verdict Form for Phase I, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273
(Fla. 11th. Cir. Ct. June 17, 1999) (on file with author).
156. See Efforts to Remove Judge, supra note 149, at 9.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Id. (quoting Judge Kaye). Recall that in Phase I of the original trial plan, the jury
was to determine how punitive damages would be calculated if it found that punitive damages were warranted. See supra Part III.C. The jury w as to set a ratio of punitive damages
to compensatory damages. Once compensatory damages were calculated for each individual class member in each individual trial, punitive damages would be set according to the
ratio. Judge Kaye was uncomfortable with the ratio method as that would cause punitive
damages to vary according to compensatory damages, even though the tobacco industry’s
behavior “was the same [toward] each class member.” Id.
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phase two; and the plaintiff class will also know what the total lump
sum punitive damage award is that will be divided by the remaining
qualified class members.”161 Recognizing that there were numerous
legal issues involved in his amended trial plan, Judge Kaye reasoned
that it was of greater benefit for the tobacco industry to know the exact amount of punitive damages rather than risk the imposition of an
unknown punitive damages award of potentially enormous proportions. 162 Predictably, the tobacco industry disagreed with Judge
Kaye’s assessment of what was in its best interest and appealed his
trial plan to the Third District Court of Appeal prior to the start of
Phase II.163
The tobacco industry argued that this trial plan violated the general rule that damages are inherently an individual issue and cannot
be determined for an entire class, but must instead be tried separately.164 The industry also argued that it was impossible to assess
punitive damages in a lump sum prior to the assessment of compensatory damages for each individual class member as constitutional
requirements demand that punitive damages bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages. 165 Initially agreeing with the tobacco industry, the Third District Court quashed Judge Kaye’s supplemental
trial plan “permitting an aggregate trial on the amount of punitive
damages prior to a determination of liability and compensatory damages.”166 However, the plaintiffs asked the court to reconsider its ruling and on September 17, 1999, the Third District Court vacated its
previous order and set the issue for oral argument. 167
The tobacco industry argued that the Third District Court should
enforce its mandate of January 31, 1996, in which it stated that the
issue of damages would have to be tried separately.168 Surprisingly,

161. Id. (quoting Judge Kaye).
162. See id.
163. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2061 (Fla. 3d DCA
Sept. 3, 1999).
164. See Disqualification Denied, Appeal Filed in Engle; Punitives Class-Wide; Co-Lead
Plaintiff Dies, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, Aug. 19, 1999, at 8.
165. See id. In an amicus brief, Associated Industries of Florida worried that assessment of one lump sum punitive damage award “will remain the same even if the defendants prevailed in virtually all of the subsequent phase three trials of individual compe nsatory damages.” Efforts to Remove Judge, supra note 149, at 9 (quoting amicus brief).
166. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2061 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept.
3, 1999). Not surprisingly, this opinion was in agreement with the Third District Court’s
statement in its first Engle opinion when it stated that the issue of damages must be tried
individually.
167. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2193 (Fla. 3d DCA
Sept. 17, 1999).
168. See Engle Court Wants Response to Constitutional Challenge of Lump Sum Punitives, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: TOBACCO, Nov. 4, 1999, at 13 [hereinafter Challenge of Lump
Sum Punitives]. The tobacco industry was referring to the Third District Court opinion affirming certification of the class, in which it said that the issue of damages would have to
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the Third District Court decided not to enforce its previous statement
and denied the industry’s motion to enforce mandate. 169 However, the
court denied the tobacco industry’s motion without prejudice to the
industry’s “right to raise the underlying issues . . . on any appropriate subsequent appeal.”170 Thus, in a time period of just over one
month, the Third District Court went from ordering the trial court to
vacate its trial plan to refusing to order the trial court to comply with
the Third District Court’s own opinion on the trial of punitive damages.
The tobacco industry then took its arguments to the Florida Supreme Court and requested a “Petition for Writ of Prohibition and
Mandamus or in the Alternative, Request for an Extraordinary Writ
Under the All Writs Power.”171 The Supreme Court refused to grant
the requested writ, but, like the Third District Court, ruled without
prejudice to raise the underlying issues as appropriate in any subsequent direct appeal to the district court. 172 While waiting on the
court’s ruling, Phase II, involving the assessment of compensatory
damages for the three representative class members, began on November 1, 1999.173
On April 7, 2000, following the Phase II trial, Engle again made
history when it became the first class action to assess actual damages against the tobacco industry. The jury found that smoking was
the legal cause of the three representative class members’ illnesses. 174
The jury went on to assess $2,850,000 in compensatory damages to
representative class member Mary Farnan; $5,831,000 in compensatory damages to Frank Amodeo; and a total of $4,023,000 in compensatory damages for the Della Vecchia family.175 With the first part of
Phase II and the appeals on the issue of the assessment of punitive
damages completed, the trial court was ready to proceed to the controversial assessment of punitive damages for the entire class.

be tried separately. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 41 (Fla. 3d DCA
1996).
169. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D2392 (Fla. 3d DCA
Oct. 20, 1999).
170. Id.
171. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 751 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1999).
172. See id.
173. See Challenge of Lump Sum Punitives, supra note 168.
174. See Verdict Form for Phase II, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 2000) (on file with author).
175. See id. The Della Vecchia family included the Estate of Angie Della Vecchia;
Ralph Della Vecchia, the husband of Angie Della Vecchia who recovered for loss of companionship, loss of protection, and mental pain and suffering; and James Della Vecchia, the
son of Angie Della Vecchia, who recovered for loss of parental companionship, instruction,
guidance, and mental pain and suffering. See id. It has not yet been determined if this
judgment will withstand the tobacco industry appeal.
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The trial on the assessment of punitive damages began on May
22, 2000, and proceeded for two months. 176 After hearing from a multitude of witnesses, the case was given to the jury to decide how
much the tobacco industry had to pay in punitive damages. After deliberating for less than five hours, the jury returned its verdict and
ordered the tobacco industry to pay $144.8 billion.177 While this verdict was below the $200 billion requested by the plaintiffs, it was still
a stunning victory. However, there is great concern that the award of
punitive damages in Engle may be an exercise in futility that will be
overturned on appeal as the Engle trial plan appears to be contrary
to both federal constitutional and Florida law.
The trial plan allowed the jury to award punitive damages to all of
the class members without a finding of liability to individual plaintiffs for their alleged injuries. 178 The only finding of liability prior to
the award of punitive damages was a finding of general liability to
the class. Thus, if the award of punitive damages survives appeal,
each individual class member that proves he or she was injured will
be entitled to an equal portion of the punitive damages award. Assuming that each of the estimated 500,000 class members is able to
prove injury, each will be entitled to $290,000 in punitive damages.
Each qualified class member will be entitled to the same amount of
punitive damages no matter the amount of compensatory damages
awarded. In other words, the amount of punitive damages awarded
to any individual class member will bear no relationship to the
amount of actual damages awarded. Instead, the amount of punitive
damages each class member recovers will only be dependent on the
number of class members that obtain a finding of liability in their individual trials, as the lump sum punitive damages award is to be divided equally amongst the class.
The possibility of such an award not only raised the concern of the
tobacco companies, the State of Florida and the Attorney General of
the State of Florida also became concerned. The Florida Legislature
responded by creating a new Florida law that would assist the tobacco industry by staying the execution of a large punitive damages
award during the process of any appeal. 179 The Attorney General,
176. See Tobacco Industry Wins a Round in Court, MIAMI BUS . DAILY REV ., May 23,
2000, at A3.
177. See Levin, supra note 3.
178. See supra Part III.C.
179. See Act effective May 9, 2000, ch. 00-128, § 4, 2000 Fla. Laws (to be codified at
FLA. STAT. § 768.733). The Act created a new law that changed the amount of the bond, required in a certified class action, to stay the execution of judgment entered for punitive
damages while the award was on appeal. See id. Under the new law, the bond required to
stay execution of judgment is capped at $100 million. See id. Prior to this new law, the tobacco industry would have had to post a bond in the amount of the entire award, $144.8
billion, plus “twice the statutory rate of interest” on the total judgment. FLA. R. APP. P.
9.310. The statutory rate of interest is set by the Comptroller of the State of Florida each
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Robert Butterworth, went even further than trying to protect the tobacco industry’s ability to appeal and joined with the tobacco companies in claiming that the trial plan was contrary to the law of Florida
and to the tobacco industry’s due process rights under the U.S. Constitution. 180 Attorney General Butterworth went so far as to propose
legislation that would prevent the type of trial plan that was put in
place in Engle.181
Certainly the Attorney General is incorrect, and the trial court did
not decide on a trial plan that will be overturned on appeal. Yet, although the Supreme Court of Florida and the Third District Court of
Appeal refused to order the trial court to vacate its current trial plan,
neither court expressly approved the current plan. The courts simply
denied the tobacco industry’s request to enforce the statement of the
Third District Court that damages would have to be tried individually. Thus, the issue of the assessment of damages will be before
these two courts again, and quite possibly, could end up in front of
the U.S. Supreme Court on a constitutional challenge. The question
then becomes, based upon federal constitutional and Florida law,
what is the likely outcome of the pending appeal of this enormous
punitive damages award?

year and was set at 10% per annum in 2000. See FLA. STAT. § 55.03 (2000). Thus, in order
to stay execution of judgment pending appeal, the tobacco industry would have had to post
a bond in the amount of $144.8 billion plus 20% interest. Note that the statutory rate of interest has been set at 10% since 1995, however, the Comptroller raised it to 11% for 2001.
See Statutory Interest Rates Pursuant to s. 55.03, Florida Statutes, http://www.dbf.state.
fl.us/interest.html (last visited May 1, 2001).
180. See 00-21 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 1 (2000) (finding that “an award of compensatory
damages is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages where an actual damage is an
essential element of the underlying tort”); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1.
181. See id. The opinion of Attorney General Butterworth was provided upon the request of Toni Jennings, President, The Florida Senate, and John E. Thrasher, President,
The Florida House of Representatives. See id. Attorney General Butterworth recommended
that the Florida Legislature enact a new law in the event that the legislature found it necessary “to codify the common law regarding the imposition of compensatory and punitive
damages.” Id. The proposed legislation would create Section 768.726, Florida Statutes, and
read as follows:
(1) No punitive damages may be awarded in any civil action, including a class
action, unless the compensatory damages stage of the trial has been completed
as to all plaintiffs covered thereby or in the action, whether named parties or
represented class members, prior to the determination of punitive damages, except in cases where actual damages are not an element of the underlying cause
of action. Any punitive damage determination rendered or judgment entered
contrary to the provisions of this subsection is null and void.
(2) This section shall apply to all cases and causes of action, regardless of the
date of filing, pending on or after the effective date of this act.
Id. at 12-13. The proposed legislation was not passed during the 2000 session of the Florida Legislature.
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IV. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND F LORIDA STANDARDS FOR
THE A SSESSMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. The Federal Constitutional Standard for the Assessment of
Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are designed to accomplish two purposes: punishment and deterrence.182 Recently, in light of a concern over the
perceived rapid expansion in the amount of punitive damages
awards, a new area of constitutional law has developed concerning
the assessment of punitive damages. 183 This new area of constitutional law is particularly concerned with limitations that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places on the procedure of assessing punitive damages and their amount. 184
The fundamental purpose of the Due Process Clause is to guarantee fairness in the legal system. 185 The idea that the assessment of
punitive damages must comply with due process originated in a concurring opinion authored by Justice O’Connor in 1988.186 In this opinion, Justice O’Connor wrote that the exercise by juries of “wholly
standardless discretion” in establishing punishments appears to violate the strictures of due process. 187 Shortly after this opinion was issued, defendants began to challenge punitive damages on both procedural and substantive due process violations. 188 As these challenges
became more prevalent, it became clear the Supreme Court would
soon be forced to define the boundaries of this alleged due process
right.

182. See James R. McKown, Punitive Damages: State Trends and Developments, 14
REV . LITIG. 419, 422 (1995).
183. See Douglas G. Harkin, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: A Trial Judge’s
Guide to Jury Instructions and Judicial Review of Punitive Damage Awards, 60 MONT. L.
REV . 367, 368 (1999).
184. See Stephanie L. Nagel, BMW v. Gore: The United States Supreme Court Overturns an Award of Punitive Damages as Violative of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, 71 TUL. L. REV . 1025, 1028 (1997). Attempts to create a new branch of constitutional
law on the issue of punitive damages as it concerns the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive
Fines Clause was snuffed out by the Supreme Court in Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989). In Browning-Ferris, the Court ruled that the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines is not applicable to civil suits between
private parties. See id. at 264.
185. See Nagel, supra note 184, at 1028.
186. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part).
187. Id.
188. The arguments in these two types of challenges were quite different. In a procedural due process challenge, the defendant would typically challenge either the instructions given to the jury or the process of reviewing the award of punitive damages. See Nagel, supra note 184, at 1028. In a substantive due process challenge, the defendant would
challenge the amount of the punitive damages award as excessive, arguing that it thus
constituted a taking of property without due process of law. See id.
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The definition of due process rights involved in the assessment of
punitive damages began in 1991 when the Court issued its first majority opinion on the issue in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip.189 In Haslip, the defendant appealed an award of punitive
damages that was more than four times the amount of compen satory
damages. 190 In particular, the defendant challenged the process of
awarding punitive damages in Alabama, the forum state, as violative
of its procedural due process rights by claiming the award was “the
product of unbridled jury discretion.”191 Wanting to resolve the “longenduring debate” on the assessment of punitive damages, the Court
granted certiorari to review both the process of assessing punitive
damages and the constitutionality of the amount of punitive damages
award.192
The Court began by reviewing the common law method of assessing punitive damages. Under the common law method, the jury was
instructed on the “need to deter similar wrongful conduct” prior to
deciding on an amount of punitive damages. 193 If the jury chose to enter an award of punitive damages, the award was then reviewed by
the “trial and appellate courts to ensure that it [was] reasonable.” 194
After reviewing the common law method, the Court reasoned that
this method was sufficient to protect the defendant’s procedural due
process rights because “[p]unitive damages have long been a part of
traditional state tort law,” and the common law method is not “so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional.”195 However, the Court warned that just “because punitive
damages [had] been recognized for so long” did not mean that they
were always constitutional. 196
The greatest concern of the Court in Haslip, however, was not the
common law method of assessing punitive damages but, instead, the
limitation of jury discretion, as it felt that unlimited jury discretion
could lead to “extreme results that jar one’s constitutional sensibilities.”197 As such, the Court wanted to establish a postverdict review
standard for a reviewing court to determine whether a jury’s award
was reasonable. In setting this standard, the Court refused to “draw
a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable
and the constitutionally unacceptable,” and instead, simply stated
that “general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

499 U.S. 1 (1991).
See id. at 23.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15, 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
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from the court . . . properly enter into the constitutional calculus.” 198
Based on this vague standard of reasonableness and guidance, the
Court set out to determine whether the process of awarding punitive
damages in Alabama provided the defendant with sufficient protection against unbridled jury discretion.
Specifically, the Court analyzed the instructions given to the jury
and the process of review by the trial and appellate courts. Beginning
with the jury instructions, the Court found that the instructions
given to the jury on awarding punitive damages cannot give the jury
unlimited discretion.199 To limit the jury’s discretion, the Court approved the instructions used by the trial court in Haslip which instructed the jury “not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury” and
confined the award of punitive damages to “deterrence and retribution,” and further instructed the jury to “take into consideration the
character and degree of the wrong.”200 Because of these three limitations on the jury’s discretion, the Haslip jury instructions sufficiently
protected the defendant’s procedural due process rights because they
“reasonably accommodated [the defendant’s] interest in rational decisionmaking and [the state’s] interest in meaningful individualized
assessment of appropriate deterrence and retribution.”201
As far as the review process was concerned, the Court ruled that
the postverdict review process in Alabama was adequate because it
“[made] certain that the punitive damages [were] reasonable in their
amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has occurred and to deter its repetition.”202 The Court noted that the Alabama Supreme Court had previously set forth specific standards
which assured that the punitive damages were in proportion to the
severity of the offense.203 With these procedural protections in place,
the Court found that the defendant in Haslip had received all of the
198. Id.
199. See id. at 19-20.
200. Id. at 19.
201. Id. at 20.
202. Id. at 21.
203. See id. at 22. The standards set forth for the appellate court to consider on review
were:
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages
award and the harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct as well as the
harm that actually has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant’s awareness, any
concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the
profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of
removing that profit and of having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the ‘financial position’ of the defendant; (e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in
mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for
the same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.
Id. at 21-22.
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due process protections to which it was entitled and affirmed the
award of punitive damages. 204
Thus, after Haslip, defendants had a clear procedural due process
right to ensure that fact-finders did not have unlimited discretion in
their assessment of punitive damages. To limit discretion, reasonable
constraints had to be placed on a jury’s discretion, using both the
jury instructions and the postverdict review process. With these limitations in place, the Court was satisfied that reviewing courts could
sufficiently determine “whether a particular award [was] greater
than reasonably necessary to punish and deter.”205
While the Haslip opinion dealt mainly with the procedural due
process rights involved in the assessment of punitive damages, the
Court also made a statement on the substantive limit of punitive
damages. The Court noted that a punitive damages award greater
than four times the compensatory damages award “may be close to
the line” of impropriety.206 This comment led many to believe that the
Court would limit the amount of punitive damages to an amount of
four to five times the amount of actual damages. 207 However, the
Court’s next case on this issue, TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 208 proved this belief to be incorrect.
In TXO, the Court was again faced with the issue of the due process rights involved in the assessment of punitive damages. While at
the conclusion of TXO the Court would maintain the Haslip standard
on limiting the discretion of the jury, the Court added to the Haslip
standard regarding the postverdict review of a punitive damages
award.209 TXO involved an award of punitive damages that was 526
times the amount of compensatory damages. 210 The defendant, TXO
Production Corporation (TXO), argued that a punitive damage award
of this magnitude “[was] so excessive that it must be deemed an arbitrary deprivation of property without due process of law.”211 In light
of Haslip, in which the Court stated that a punitive damages award
four times the amount of compensatory damages was close to being
constitutionally improper, TXO argued that a punitive damages
award of 526 times compensatory damages was improper. 212 However, following its statement in Haslip that a bright line mathemati-

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See id. at 23-24.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
See Harkin, supra note 183, at 376.
509 U.S. 443 (1993).
See id.
See id. at 453.
Id.
See id.
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cal rule could not be established, the Court refused to overturn the
award of punitive damages. 213
The Court began its review of the punitive damages award by
again placing primary importance on a defendant’s procedural due
process rights in the assessment of punitive damages. 214 The Court
went so far as to state that “[a]ssuming that fair procedures were followed, a judgment that is a product of that process is entitled to a
strong presumption of validity.”215 The Court further noted that there
are “persuasive reasons for suggesting that the presumption should
be irrebuttable.”216 Thus, great credence was to be given to the verdict of the jury, and so long as fair procedures were followed, the
Court felt that reviewing courts should rarely overturn an award of
punitive damages.
In response to the defendant’s argument that a punitive damages
award of 526 times the amount of compensatory damages must be
excessive, the Court found that the ratio of compensatory to punitive
damages was not the controlling factor in determining whether an
award was excessive.217 While the Court felt that punitive damages
must bear some relation to compensatory damages, it found that this
comparison was just one of many factors to consider when determining an award’s reasonableness. 218 Instead, the Court reasoned it was
more appropriate to look at both the conduct of the defendant and
the “disparity between the punitive award and the potential harm” in
order to determine if a punitive award was excessive.219 In light of
the malicious conduct and bad faith of the defendant in TXO and the
potential harm to the plaintiffs, the Court approved an award of 526
times compensatory damages as not being “so ‘grossly excessive’ as to
be beyond the power of the State to allow.”220
Thus, following TXO, the due process rights involved in the assessment of punitive damages became clearer. The reviewing court
must first determine if the process of assessing punitive damages violated the defendant’s due process rights. 221 If the court determined
that the procedures were fair, it must then look at the award itself to
determine whether the award is grossly excessive and therefore unconstitutional. 222 In determining whether the award is excessive, the

213. See id. at 458.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 457.
216. Id. (citing J. Scalia’s concurrence in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 24-40 (1991)).
217. See id. at 459-60.
218. See id.
219. Id. at 462.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 458.
222. See id. at 462.
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reviewing court should look not only at a comparison between the
amount of punitive damages and the amount of compensatory damages, but also at the actions of the defendant and the potential harm
that could result from the defendant’s conduct. 223 However, the Court
made it very clear that so long as proper procedures were followed,
the verdict of the jury was to be given great respect. 224
The Court then shifted away from giving great credence to the
verdict of the jury in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. 225 To start,
the process of assessing punitive damages was not at issue in BMW,
as both sides conceded that the process used met the standard established in Haslip.226 The sole issue before the Court was whether a
punitive damage award of $2 million, in light of a compensatory
award in the amount of $4000, violated substantive due process as
grossly excessive.227
The Court started by stating the general rule that “[o]nly when an
award can fairly be categorized as ‘grossly excessive’ in relation to
[the state’s interest in punishing reprehensible conduct] does it enter
the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”228 To determine whether a punitive damage award crosses into “the zone of arbitrariness,” the Court explained that the following three guideposts should be considered: 1)
the reprehensibility of the actions of the defendant; 2) the difference
between the actual harm or potential harm and the amount of punitive damages; and 3) the amount of governmental penalties or sanctions authorized for similar conduct as compared to the amount of
punitive damages. 229
Starting with the first guidepost, the Court found that the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions was perhaps “the most
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award” as the award “should reflect ‘the enormity of [the] offense.’”230
To assist other courts in determining the enormity of the offense, the
Court set out a range for reprehensible acts. For in stance, the Court
stated that nonviolent crimes are less reprehensible than violent
crimes; deceit is worse than pure negligence; and pure economic
harm is less reprehensible than conduct that is a danger to human

223. See id. at 460.
224. See id. at 457.
225. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
226. See id. at 565; see also Bruce J. McKee, The Implications of BMW v. Gore for Future Punitive Damages Litigation: Observations from a Participant, 48 ALA. L. REV . 175,
181 (1996).
227. See McKee, supra note 226, at 183-84. This punitive damage award was 500 times
the amount of compensatory damages.
228. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
229. Id. at 575-85.
230. Id. at 575.
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health and safety.231 Through this loose assortment, the Court supplied reviewing courts with a general idea of the degrees of reprehensibility. The Court also took particular notice of aggravating factors
like, “deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or
concealment of evidence of improper motive,” that would support a
large punitive damage award.232 After determining that the actions of
the defendant in BMW were not of a high degree of reprehensibility,
the Court moved to a discussion of the second guidepost. 233
According to the Court, the “most commonly cited indicium of an
unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award is its ratio to the
actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff.”234 While this test essentially
compares the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the
amount of punitive damages awarded, the test is not as easy as a
simple comparison. Restating TXO, the Court explained that the
“harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct” must also be
considered when comparing actual harm to the punitive damages
award.235 While the Court continued its refusal to draw a “mathematical bright line . . . that would fit every case,” the Court found
that a punitive damage award of 500 times compensatory damages
was excessive as the defendant’s conduct in BMW was not sufficiently reprehensible. 236
The Court then established the third guidepost for determining
whether an award of punitive damages is excessive: government
sanctions for comparable misconduct. 237 This guidepost considers the
criminal and civil penalties that are available to punish similar conduct. 238 Believing it appropriate to give “’substantial deference’ to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions,” the Court
compared an award of punitive damages to other potential sanctions. 239 If the punitive damage award were significantly larger than
an available civil penalty, there would be good reason to find the
award excessive as the legislature had not deemed the particular
conduct to be extremely reprehensible.
BMW is the most recent statement by the Supreme Court on the
due process rights involved in the assessment of punitive damages.
While the BMW test is certainly not the easiest to apply, the Court
has at least given reviewing courts a standard to follow. A court reviewing an award of punitive damages is required to first determine
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See id. at 576.
Id. at 579.
See id. at 580.
Id.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 583.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 583-84.

820

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:787

the reprehensibility of a defendant’s actions. 240 Based on the existing
degree of reprehensibility, the court should then proceed to compare
the amount of punitive damages to the potential harm caused to the
plaintiff.241 Obviously, as a defendant moves up the scale of reprehensibility, the defendant becomes eligible for a higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. The Court should then compare the award to applicable civil or criminal sanctions. 242 Giving
great deference to the judgment of the legislature, if the punitive
damage award greatly exceeds the punishment provided by the legislature, the reviewing court should reduce the award to a satisfactory
level. 243
It is also clear that the Supreme Court no longer requires a reviewing court to give great deference to the judgment of the jury. For
whatever reason, the jury in BMW felt that the defendant needed to
be assessed a large amount of punitive damages in order to be properly punished. However, while it was conceded that the process of assessing punitive damages was fair, the Court, who did not hear all of
the evidence presented to the jury, proceeded to reverse the jury’s
award of punitive damages. 244
B. Florida Law on the Assessment of Punitive Damages
While the Supreme Court has placed primary importance on the
reprehensibility of a defendant’s actions in determining whether an
award of punitive damages is excessive, the Florida Legislature has
taken a different approach. A new Florida law provides an exact formula based upon the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages for determining whether a punitive damages award is excessive.245 Under this new law, punitive damages are limited to either
three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded to each
claimant or $500,000, whichever is greater.246 Thus, Florida courts
have been ordered by the Florida Legislature to look solely at the ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages, rather than taking into consideration the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct,
to determine whether an award is excessive. The only exception to
the ratio imposed by the Florida Legislature is that punitive damages can be assessed at four times compensatory damages if the actions of the defendant were “motivated solely by unreasonable finan-

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

See id. at 575.
See id. at 580-81.
See id. at 583.
See id. at 583-84.
See id. at 586.
See FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (2000).
See id. § 768.73(1)(a)(1)-(2).
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cial gain.”247 However, this new law is not applicable to Engle, as it
did not take effect until October 1, 1999, well after the Engle trial
plan was entered and the trial began.248
The statutory law applicable to Engle allows the courts to look at
more than just the ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages. While the statute in effect during Engle also includes a ratio of
three times compensatory damages, punitive damages in excess of
this ratio are only presumed to be excessive. 249 The presumption can
be overcome if the “claimant demonstrates to the court by clear and
convincing evidence that the award is not excessive in light of the
facts and circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact.” 250
Thus, the courts can affirm an award of punitive damages that is
more than three times compensatory damages if the actions of the
defendant are sufficiently reprehensible to overcome the presumption of excessiveness. However, the Florida Legislature specifically
excluded class actions from this statutory presumption. 251 Since the
Florida Legislature decided not to limit the amount of punitive damages by statute to class actions, any protections against the improper
assessment of punitive damages in class actions must be derived
from case law.
Florida case law provides two protections against an excessive
amount of punitive damages: 1) the award must be related to the defendant’s ability to pay, and 2) the award must have some relation to
the reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions. 252 In contrast to statutory law, Florida case law provides that punitive damages do not
have to bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages. 253
The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that requiring such a relationship would lead to “an inflexible rule of law that translates into the
application of [a] strict mathematical formula.”254 The court was also
concerned about the evolution of a strict mathematical rule that
would allow an affluent defendant who committed an egregious act,
but only caused minimal injury, to escape being properly punished. 255

247. Id. § 768.73(1)(b). Section 768.73(1)(c), Florida Statutes, states that if the factfinder determines that there was a specific intent to harm, there is no cap on punitive
damages.
248. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1999, ch. 99-225, § 23, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1416-18
(amending FLA. STAT. §768.73 (1997)).
249. See FLA. STAT. §768.73 (1997), amended by Act effective Oct. 1, 1999, ch. 99-225, §
23, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1416-18.
250. Id.
251. See id.
252. See Bankers Multiple Life Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 1985); see
also Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1978); Lassitter v. International
Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1977).
253. See Bankers Multiple Life, 464 So. 2d at 533.
254. Lassitter, 349 So. 2d at 626.
255. See id.
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In response to this concern, Florida courts have developed a line of
case law that allows for punitive damages even if no compensatory
damages are awarded. This line of case law culminated in the case of
Ault v. Lohr,256 where the Florida Supreme Court was faced with the
following question: “[M]ust a compensatory damages award underlie
a punitive damages award in a case in which the jury has made express findings against a defendant?”257
In Ault, the plaintiffs were escaped inmates who, when recaptured, were handcuffed, and a police dog was then ordered to “bite
and scratch them.”258 The plaintiffs sued for assault and battery, and
the jury awarded one of them $0 in compensatory damages and
$5000 in punitive damages. 259 Because of conflicting interpretations
by several Florida district courts, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, which was trying Ault, asked the Florida
Supreme Court to clarify a prior opinion. 260 In McLain v. Pensacola
Coach Corp.,261 the supreme court had stated that “exemplary or punitive damages are not recoverable in an action of tort unless actual
damages are shown.”262 To clarify McLain, the court held in Ault that
a “finding of liability alone will support an award of punitive damages ‘even in the absence of financial loss for which compensatory
damages would be appropriate.’”263
The Florida Supreme Court actually preferred a method of assessing punitive damages based largely on the defendant’s ability to
pay.264 However, the court felt that the ability to pay could not be the
only factor in determining the amount of punitive damages because
affluent defendants could not be charged with a higher award of punitive damages simply because of their increased ability to pay. Further, under this method, an award could not be so large as to bankrupt the defendant. 265 While a punitive damage award “should be
painful enough to provide some retribution and deterrence,” an
award which “bears no relation to the defendant’s ability to pay . . .
and results in economic castigation” may be found excessive.266
The court determined that it was “not an accurate rule of law that
the greater a defendant’s wealth, the greater must be [the amount of]

256. 538 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1989).
257. Id. at 454-55.
258. Id. at 455.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 454.
261. 13 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1943).
262. Id. at 222.
263. Ault, 538 So. 2d at 456.
264. See id.
265. See Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1978); Lipsig v. Ramlawi,
760 So. 2d 170, 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
266. Brooks v. Rios, 707 So. 2d 374, 375 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
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punitive damages.”267 Instead, the court determined that the net
worth of the defendant was only one factor to be considered in assessing punitive damages; the reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions
must also be considered when determining whether an award is excessive.268 Looking at the size of the award and the actions of the defendant, the court can then review an award and overturn it if the
award is a shock to the judicial conscience.269
Beyond the above postverdict protections on the amount of punitive damages, the Florida Supreme Court provided one additional
protection to defendants in the process of assessing punitive damages. In the case of W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters,270 the court changed
the process of assessing punitive damages in Florida. All trial courts
in Florida were ordered to bifurcate trials involving punitive damages when requested by a timely motion.271 Under this new process,
the jury is supposed to determine liability, actual damages, and
whether punitive damages are permitted in the first phase of the
trial. 272 If the jury finds that punitive damages are indeed permitted,
the case proceeds to the second phase where the jury determines
whether punitive damages are necessary and in what amount. 273
Such a system protects defendants by “promot[ing] just punishment
and deterrence while avoiding prejudice and bias.”274 This system
prevents prejudice and bias by allowing defendants to present certain mitigating evidence in the punitive damages phase of the trial,
such as prior punitive damages arising out of the same course of conduct, that, if admitted prior to a finding of liability, could cause bias
amongst the jury.275
To summarize, Florida case law provides that punitive damages
do not have to be reasonably related to compensatory damages. In
fact, so long as the jury finds the defendant liable, it can award punitive damages even if it declines to award compensatory damages. Instead, the jury is to assess punitive damages based upon the defendant’s ability to pay and the reprehensibility of the defendant’s actions. If the defendant is found liable, courts are allowed to intervene
267. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 1985).
268. See id.
269. See Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 627 (Fla.
1977). To be truly shocking, “the amount [of the award must be] so great . . . as to indicate
that the jury must have found it while under the influence of passion, prejudice, or gross
mistake.” Id.
270. 638 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1994).
271. See id. at 506.
272. See id.
273. See id. “Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant engages in conduct
which is fraudulent, malicious, deliberately violent or oppressive, or committed with such
gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard for the rights of others.” Id. at 503.
274. McKown, supra note 182, at 446.
275. See id. at 447.
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or reverse an award of punitive damages only if the award will either
bankrupt the defendant or is so high that it shocks the judicial conscience.
V. APPLICATION OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND F LORIDA LAW TO
THE E NGLE TRIAL PLAN
Due to the protections and limitations provided by Florida case
law and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an
appeal of the Engle jury’s landmark award of punitive damages
should result in a reversal. While there will be many issues involved
in any such appeal, such as the certification of Engle as a class action, the method of assessing punitive damages presents one of the
best reasons for the appellate courts to reverse this award. Quite
simply, the assessment of punitive damages to an entire class of injured Florida smokers prior to any findings of individual liability and
individual harm for each class member violates both Florida law and
the due process rights of the tobacco industry. While the Engle court
was clearly concerned about congesting the Florida court system by
holding hundreds of thousands of individual trials on the issue of
damages, due process cannot be sacrificed for the sake of judicial
economy.
As previously discussed in depth, the Engle trial court divided the
trial into three separate phases. In Phase I, the jury found the tobacco industry liable for damages caused to the Engle class, due to
the manipulation of nicotine levels and the concealment of relevant
facts in order to cause the users of its product to become addicted. 276
The jury also found that the tobacco industry’s actions were so egregious that punitive damages were permitted. 277 The trial then proceeded to Phase II. Phase II was bifurcated, and in the first part of
the phase, the jury found that the tobacco industry was liable for the
injuries caused to three representative class members and assessed
compensatory damages. 278 The trial then proceeded to the second
part of Phase II and the assessment of punitive damages in one lump
sum, for the benefit of the entire class. 279 It is this second part of
Phase II that falls short of the legal requirements for the assessment
of punitive damages.

276. See Verdict Form for Phase I, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273
(Fla. 11th. Cir. Ct. June 17, 1999) (on file with author).
277. See id.
278. See Verdict Form for Phase II, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 2000) (on file with author).
279. See Levin supra note 3.
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The first concern is clearly that the amount of this award may violate Florida law by bankrupting the tobacco industry.280 Prior to a
change in Florida law, the Engle trial plan may have bankrupted the
tobacco industry before completing the appellate process, as Florida
law would have required the industry to post a bond in the amount of
the judgment, $144.8 billion, “plus twice the statutory rate of interest
on [the judgment],” in order to obtain a stay of execution of the
award.281 As the tobacco industry would likely not have been able to
post a bond in this amount, it would have been forced to appeal the
award without obtaining a stay of execution. Thus, because the tobacco industry could not have stayed execution, it likely would have
been bankrupted before the case worked its way through the appellate courts. Fortunately for the tobacco industry, the Florida Legislature alleviated this problem with the enactment of a new statute setting the maximum bond at $100 million.282
Even though the Florida Legislature alleviated the problem of
bankrupting the tobacco industry during the appellate process, the
$144.8 billion award may still violate Florida law by bankrupting the
tobacco industry once the appellate process is completed. 283 The tobacco industry contended during the punitive damages phase that it
had a net worth of approximately $15 billion.284 If the tobacco industry’s contentions are indeed true, enforcement of the $145 billion
award would bankrupt the entire industry and violate Florida law.
However, even if the tobacco industry can afford to pay the Engle
judgment, the award should still be overturned on appeal as the
process of assessing punitive damages under the Engle trial plan violates both Florida law on the assessment of punitive damages and
the tobacco industry’s due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In analyzing the process of assessing punitive damages in Engle,
the reviewing court must determine whether the Engle court complied with Haslip by placing sufficient limitations on the discretion of
the jury.285 The Engle court started by instructing the jury that it
could decide not to assess punitive damages. 286 The court then limited
280. See Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1978); Lipsig v. Ramlawi,
760 So. 2d 170, 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
281. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.310. The statutory interest, as discussed previously, is currently
set at 11%.
282. See Act effective May 9, 2000, ch. 00-128, § 4, 2000 Fla. Laws 128 (to be codified at
Fla. Stat. § 768.733).
283. See Wackenhut, 359 So. 2d at 436; Lipsig, 760 So. 2d at 188.
284. See Final Judgment and Amended Omnibus Order, Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco
Co., No. 94-08273 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000), http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/
tobacco/englerjfinaljudorder.pdf; see also Levin, supra note 3.
285. See Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
286. See Jury Instructions for Phase IIB Punitive Damages, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-8273 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 2000).
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the discretion of the jury by instructing that the following eleven factors be considered in assessing punitive damages: 1) the amount of
punitive damages should be reasonably related to any harm that resulted or is likely to result from the tobacco industry’s actions; 2) the
degree of reprehensibility of the industry’s actions; 3) the profitability of the industry’s actions; 4) the financial condition of the tobacco
industry; 5) the costs of litigation; 6) the punishment the tobacco industry will receive from other sources; 7) the hazard caused to the
public by the industry’s actions; 8) the industry’s awareness of the
hazard; 9) the number of employees of the industry involved in causing or covering up its actions; 10) the duration of the industry’s conduct; and 11) other civil awards against the tobacco industry for the
same conduct. 287 As these factors placed reasonable limitations on the
jury’s discretion, Engle clearly meets the standard established in
Haslip. However, the fact that the Engle court complied with Haslip
does not overcome the failure to protect the due process rights of the
tobacco industry under BMW.
Based on the guideposts established in BMW, the degree of reprehensibility of the tobacco industry’s conduct must first be determined.288 In Phase I of the trial, the jury found the tobacco industry
committed numerous reprehensible actions in its attempts to conceal
and cover up the hazardous health consequences of smoking cigarettes. 289 While the industry’s actions are not on the highest level of
the scale of reprehensibility, such as the commission of violent
crimes, clearly the tobacco industry’s actions are on the upper level of
this scale. The industry simply ignored the health and safety of its
consumers and affirmatively lied to the users of its products about
the negative health effects of smoking. If the degree of reprehensibility had been the only guidepost enunciated by the Court, considering
the profit motive behind the industry’s actions as an aggravating factor, the $145 billion award of punitive damages would not be considered excessive. However, while the degree of reprehensibility was
found to be the most important guidepost, it clearly was not the only
guidepost.
In the second guidepost of BMW, the Court established that the
award of punitive damages must be compared to the actual or potential harm of the defendant’s actions. 290 Herein lies the problem with
Engle. The courts simply cannot perform this part of the BMW test.
At the time punitive damages were awarded, other than for three
representative class members, there has been no showing of actual
287. See id.
288. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
289. See Verdict Form for Phase I, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273
(Fla. 11th. Cir. Ct. June 17, 1999) (on file with author).
290. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 580.
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damages to any individual class members. In a class that has been
estimated at 500,000 class members, other than blatantly guessing
at the total amount of damage caused to the class, the reviewing
court simply has no way to compare the punitive damages award to
compensatory damages.
Arguably, a court could use the $12.6 million award of compensatory damages to the representative class members to estimate the
potential harm caused by the tobacco industry. A court could also
work backwards and determine the amount of compensatory damages that would be required to affirm the Engle award. Using the affirmed ratio of punitive damages from TXO, of 526 times compensatory damages, 291 an estimation of 500,000 Engle class members, and
the award of $145 billion in punitive damages in Engle, a finding of
compensatory damages in the amount of approximately $550 for each
class member would meet the TXO standard. Surely, if all of the estimated 500,000 class members have injuries that were in fact
caused by the tobacco industry, this minimal amount of compensatory damages will be met. However, while it is highly likely that this
minimal amount of compensatory damages will be easily met, such a
comparison prior to the award of compensatory damages is pure
guesswork.
Without attempting to extrapolate an acceptable amount of
compensatory damages, the courts are left with no “standard by
which [they] can judge whether an assessment of punitive damages
is reasonable or is ‘grossly excessive’.”292 Because the courts cannot
compare the actual amount of compensatory damages awarded to the
entire Engle class to the amount of punitive damages awarded to the
class, the courts have no realistic way to determine whether the
award is excessive. Since the courts cannot make this determination,
the Engle trial court’s plan for the assessment of punitive damages
has prevented the tobacco industry from being afforded all of its due
process rights.
The trial plan also violates Florida law by assessing punitive
damages prior to a finding of liability as required by the Florida Supreme Court in Ault.293 While the jury found the tobacco industry was
liable for the injuries its actions caused, this finding of general liability to the class is not enough to allow for the assessment of punitive
damages for the entire class. 294 There has yet to be a determination of
291. The defendant in TXO was an asbestos manufacturer and may thus be considered
similarly situated to the tobacco companies. The courts should, therefore, have no problem
affirming a ratio of this extent.
292. 00-21 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 8 (2000).
293. See Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 456 (Fla. 1989).
294. The issue in Phase I of Engle was limited to general causation issues. See Final
Judgment and Amended Omnibus Order, Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000), http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/tobacco/englerjfinaljud
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whether any individual class member, other than the representative
class members, was in fact injured or whether a product of the tobacco industry caused his or her injury. The Phase I assessment of
liability was not so broad to mean that the tobacco industry is automatically liable for the injuries of those that claim to be members of
the class. In fact, the Phase I assessment of liability is much narrower. By finding the industry liable in Phase I, the jury simply determined that the tobacco industry is liable to all class members who
later prove in their individual trial that their respective, alleged injuries were caused by the tobacco industry. In other words, during
each class member’s individual trial, the issue of whether or not the
tobacco industry generally caused injury by manipulating nicotine
levels and concealing or misrepresenting information will not be at
issue. However, each class member will still have to prove that he or
she was in fact injured and that the products of the tobacco industry,
and not something else, were the cause of his or her injury. Thus, for
the purposes of Ault, the finding of general liability in Phase I is
simply not sufficient to allow for the assessment of punitive damages
for the entire class; there must still be a finding of individual liability.
Without a finding of individual liability and actual damages, the
Engle trial court has allowed a jury to establish a lump sum award of
punitive damages without any knowledge of the extent of the injury
caused by the tobacco industry. In fact, until the trial of all of the individual cases, it will not be known for sure how many class members exist. While no class member will become entitled to his or her
equal share of the punitive damages award until after proving individual liability and actual damages, this is not sufficient to overcome
the mandate of Ault. Ault clearly requires a finding of liability prior
to the assessment of punitive damages. 295 In setting up a method that
allows a jury to assess punitive damages for an entire class prior to a
finding of liability for each member of the class, the Engle court has
violated Florida law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proper procedure for the Engle trial court to follow would
have been to follow the plan as established by the original trial judge.
The Third District Court of Appeal, recognizing the problem in calculating damages in class actions, opined that the issue of damages
order.pdf. There has yet to be a finding of specific causation for any class membe r except
the three representative class members. Without a finding of specific causation, no liability
can be attached for harms caused to individual class members. See Ault, 538 So. 2d at 456.
Thus, by setting punitive damages for all class members without a finding of individual liability, the Engle trial plan violates the requirements of Ault. See id.
295. See Ault, 538 So. 2d at 456.
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would have to be tried individually. Unfortunately, there is no remedy for the current trial plan other than to wait for the appeal by the
tobacco industry.
It seems almost certain that the reviewing court will reverse the
award of lump-sum punitive damages and order that the trial court
amend the trial plan to include individual trials on the issues of individual causation and both compensatory and punitive damages. This
is the only constitutional way to assess punitive damages and ensure
that they are not grossly excessive. However, the current trial plan,
even if reversed, will not be a total waste of time and money.
The large award of punitive damages is a good indicator of the future of tobacco litigation. If the punitive damage award is in fact reversed on appeal, the industry may be more willing to discuss settlement. After all, the prospect of litigating in the state of Florida,
based on recent tobacco litigation in Florida, should not be terribly
pleasing to the tobacco industry. It is even possible that breaking the
assessment of punitive damages out into individual trials will lead,
cumulatively, to a much larger punitive amount than the amount assessed by the Engle jury. Further, given the reprehensibility of the
actions of the tobacco industry, individual awards of punitive damages stand a better chance of being upheld on appeal, if class members can show they were in fact injured by the tobacco industry.
A punitive award of $145 billion is letting the tobacco industry off
lightly. After decades of deceit, disease, and death, the tobacco industry is finally being forced to pay for its transgressions. However, the
Florida court system should not lift the blindfold of justice and distort the law to punish the tobacco industry. Unfortunately, even
though the tobacco industry has shown disdain for the rights of the
people that use its products, the violation of the tobacco industry’s
rights under both Florida law and federal constitutional law will
likely prevent the Engle jury from bringing the tobacco industry to
justice. Hopefully, with the advent of mounting evidence, the tide of
this great legal battle will continue to shift and this will simply be a
case of justice delayed and not justice denied.

